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ABSTRACT
High quality fake videos and audios generated by AI-
algorithms (the deep fakes) have started to challenge the sta-
tus of videos and audios as definitive evidence of events. In
this paper, we highlight a few of these challenges and discuss
the research opportunities in this direction.
Index Terms— DeepFake videos, detection techniques,
digital media forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
Falsified videos created by AI algorithms, in particular, deep
neural networks (DNNs), are a recent twist to the disconcert-
ing problem of online disinformation. Although fabrication
and manipulation of digital images and videos are not new
[1], the rapid development of DNNs in recent years has made
the process to create convincing fake videos increasingly eas-
ier and faster. DNN generated fake videos first caught the
public’s attention in late 2017, when a Reddit account with
name Deepfakes began posting synthetic pornographic videos
generated using a DNN-based face-swapping algorithm. Sub-
sequently, the term DeepFake have been used more broadly to
refer to any AI generated impersonating videos.
Currently, there are three major types of DeepFake videos.
• Head puppetry entails synthesizing a video of a target
persons whole head and upper-shoulder using a video
of a source persons head, so the synthesized target ap-
pears to behave the same way as the source.
• Face swapping involves generating a video of the tar-
get with the faces replaced by synthesized faces of the
source while keeping the same facial expressions.
• Lip syncing is to create a falsified video by only manip-
ulating the lip region so that the target appears to speak
something that s/he does not speak in reality.
Figure 1 shows some example frames of each type of
DeepFake videos aforementioned. As the first exam-
ples of DeepFakes, face swapping has been commer-
cialized and mainstreamed through readily available soft-
ware freely available on GitHub, e.g., FakeApp [2],
DFaker [3], faceswap-GAN [4], faceswap [5], and
Fig. 1. Examples of DeepFake videos: (top) Head puppetry, (mid-
dle) face swapping, and (bottom) lip syncing.
DeepFaceLab [6]. There are also emerging online services
that can generate DeepFake videos on demand (https:
//deepfakesweb.com), and there are many online dis-
cussion fora on DeepFakes. Furthermore, several start-up
companies also commercialized tools that can potentially be
used to make DeepFakes, such as Synthesia1 and Canny AI2.
While there are interesting and creative applications of
the DeepFake videos, due to the strong association of faces
to the identity of an individual, they can also be weaponized.
Well-crafted DeepFake videos can create illusions of a per-
son’s presence and activities that do not occur in reality,
which can lead to serious political, social, financial, and le-
gal consequences [7]. The potential threats range from re-
venge pornographic videos of a victim whose face is synthe-
sized and spliced in, to realistically looking videos of state
leaders seeming to make inflammatory comments they never
actually made, a high-level executive commenting about her
company’s performance to influence the global stock market,
or an online sex predator masquerades visually as a family
member or a friend in a video chat. The high stakes spawn
wide media coverage of this topic in the past two years, and
the US congress has had two public hearings to this problem.
With the escalated concerns over DeepFakes, there is a
1https://www.synthesia.io/.
2https://www.cannyai.com/.
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surge of interest in developing DeepFake detection methods
with significant progress witnessed in the past two years.
This includes (1) a slew of effective detection methods de-
veloped in less than two years, mostly based on deep learn-
ing [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]; (2) the
availability of several large-scale DeepFake video datasets
[11, 19, 15, 20, 21]; and (3) two public challenges dedicated
to DeepFake detection, namely, the DARPA MFC18 Syn-
thetic Data Detection Challenge and the Facebook DeepFake
Detection Challenge3.
Notwithstanding this progress, there are a number of criti-
cal problems that are yet to be resolved for existing DeepFake
detection methods. Furthermore, in the foreseeable future, it
is expected that the generation of DeepFake videos will con-
tinue evolving, it is thus important to anticipate such new de-
velopments and improve the detection methods accordingly.
The main objective of this paper is to highlight a few of these
challenges and discuss the research opportunities in this di-
rection.
2. CURRENT DEEPFAKE DETECTION METHODS
Current DeepFake detection methods mostly target face-
swapping videos, which account for the majorities of Deep-
Fake videos circulated online. Many of the existing methods
are formulated as frame-level binary classification problems.
Based on the features that are used, these methods fall into
three major categories. Methods in the first category are based
on inconsistencies exhibited in the physical/physiological as-
pects in the DeepFake videos. The method in work of [10]
exploits the observation that many DeepFake videos lack rea-
sonable eye blinking due to the use of online portraits as train-
ing data, which usually do not have closed eyes for aesthetic
reasons. Incoherent head poses in DeepFake videos are uti-
lized in [11] to expose DeepFake videos. In [22], the idiosyn-
cratic behavioral patterns of a particular individual are cap-
tured by the time series of facial landmarks extracted from
real videos are used to spot DeepFake videos. The second
category of DeepFake detection algorithms (e.g., [12, 13])
use signal-level artifacts introduced during the synthesis pro-
cess. Also, as synthesized faces are spliced into the original
video frames, state-of-the-art DNN splicing detection meth-
ods, e.g., [23, 24, 25, 26], can be applied. The third category
of DeepFake detection methods (e.g., [8, 9, 16, 18]) are data-
driven, which directly employ various types of DNNs trained
on real and DeepFake videos but capturing specific artifact.
2.1. Limitations
Albeit impressive progress has been made in the performance
of detection of DeepFake videos, there are several concerns
over the current detection methods that suggest caution.
3https://deepfakedetectionchallenge.ai.
U
A
D
FV
D
F-
T
IM
IT
-H
Q
FF
-D
F
D
FD
D
FD
C
Fig. 2. Visual artifacts of DeepFake videos in existing datasets,
including low-quality, visible splicing boundaries, color mismatch,
visible parts of the original face, and inconsistent face orientations.
Quality of DeepFake Datasets. The availability of large-
scale datasets of DeepFake videos is an enabling factor in
the development of DeepFake detection method. However, a
closer look at the DeepFake videos in existing datasets reveals
some stark contrasts in visual quality to the actual DeepFake
videos circulated on the Internet. Several common visual ar-
tifacts that can be found in these datasets are highlighted in
Fig.4, including low-quality synthesized faces, visible splic-
ing boundaries, color mismatch, visible parts of the original
face, and inconsistent synthesized face orientations. These
artifacts are likely the result of imperfect steps of the synthe-
sis method and the lack of curating of the synthesized videos
before included in the datasets. Moreover, DeepFake videos
with such low visual qualities can hardly be convincing, and
are unlikely to have real impact. Correspondingly, high de-
tection performance on these dataset may not bear strong rel-
evance when the detection methods are deployed in the wild.
A related issue is that DeepFake detection methods trained
using different DF datasets have trouble extending the perfor-
mance to different datasets [27].
In a recent work [27], we present a new large-scale chal-
lenging DeepFake video dataset, Celeb-DF, which contains
5, 639 high-quality DeepFake videos of celebrities generated
using improved synthesis process. We conduct a comprehen-
sive evaluation of DeepFake detection methods and datasets
to demonstrate the escalated level of challenges.
Performance Evaluation. Currently, the problem of detect-
ing DeepFake videos is commonly formulated, solved, and
evaluated as a binary classification problem, where each video
is categorized as real or a DeepFake. Such dichotomy is easy
to set up in controlled experiments, where we develop and
test DeepFake detection algorithms using videos that are ei-
ther pristine or made with DeepFake generation algorithms.
However, the picture is murkier when the detection method
is deployed in real world. For instance, videos can be fabri-
cated or manipulated in ways other than DeepFakes, so not
being detected as a DeepFake video does not necessarily sug-
gest the video is a real one. Also, a DeepFake video may
be subject to other types of manipulations and a single la-
bel may not comprehensively reflect such. Furthermore, in
a video with multiple subjects’ faces only one or a few are
generated with DeepFake for a fraction of the frames. So the
binary classification scheme needs to be extended to multi-
class, multi-label, and local classification/detection to fully
handle the complexities of real world media forgeries.
Explainability of Detection Results. Current DeepFake de-
tection methods are usually designed to perform batch anal-
ysis over a large collection videos. However, when the de-
tection methods are used in the field by journalists or law
enforcement, we usually need only to analyze a small num-
ber of videos. Numerical score corresponding to the likeli-
hood of a video being generated using a synthesis algorithm is
not as useful to the practitioners if it is not corroborated with
proper reasoning of the score. In such scenarios, it is very
typical to request a justification for the numerical score for
the analysis to be acceptable for publishing or used in court.
However, many data-driven DF detection methods, especially
those based on the use of deep neural networks, usually lack
explainability due to the black box nature of the DNN models.
Temporal Aggregation. Most existing DeepFake detection
methods are based on binary classification at the frame level,
i.e., determining the likelihood of an individual frame as real
or of DeepFake. Although simple and straightforward, there
are two issues of this methodology. First, the temporal consis-
tency among frames are not explicitly considered, as (i) many
DeepFake videos exhibit temporal artifacts and (ii) real or
DeepFake frames tend to appear in continuous intervals. Sec-
ond, it necessitates an extra step when video-level integrity
score is needed: we have to aggregate the scores over individ-
ual frames to compute such a score.
Social Media Laundering. A large fraction of online videos
are now spread through social networks, e.g., FaceBook, In-
stagram, and Twitter. To save network bandwidth and also
to protect the users’ privacy, these videos are usually striped
off meta-data, down-sized, and then heavy compressed before
they are uploaded to the social platforms. These operations,
commonly known as social media laundering, are detrimental
to recover traces of underlying manipulation, and at the same
time increase the false positive detections, i.e., classifying a
real video as a DeepFake. So far, most data-driven DeepFake
detection methods that use signal level features are much af-
fected by social media laundering. A practical measure to
improve the robustness of DeepFake detection methods to so-
cial media laundering is to actively incorporate simulations
of such effects in training data, and also enhance evaluation
datasets to include performance on social media laundered
videos, both real and synthesized.
3. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Besides continuing improving to solve the aforementioned
limitations, we also envision a few important directions of
DeepFake detection methods that will receive more attention
in the coming years.
Other Forms of DeepFakes. Although face swapping is
currently the most widely known form of DeepFake videos,
it is by no means the most effective. In particular, for the
purpose of impersonating someone, face swapping DeepFake
videos have several limitations. Psychological studies [cita-
tion] show that human face recognition largely relied on in-
formation gleaned from face shape and hairstyle. As such, to
create convincing impersonating effect, the person whose face
is to be replaced (the target) has to have similar face shape and
hairstyle to the person whose face is used for swapping (the
donor). Second, as the synthesized faces need to be spliced
into the original video frame, the inconsistencies between the
synthesized region and the rest of the original frame can be
severe and difficult to conceal.
In these respects, the other two forms of DeepFake videos,
namely, head puppetry and lip-syncing, are more effective
and thus should become the focus of subsequent research in
DeepFake detection. Methods studying whole face synthe-
sis or reenactment have experienced fast development in re-
cent years. Although there have not been as many easy-to-use
and free open-source software tools generating these types of
DeepFake videos as for the face-swapping videos, the contin-
uing sophistication of the generation algorithms will change
Fig. 3. Example frames from the Celeb-DF dataset. Left column is the frame of real videos and right five columns are corresponding
DeepFake frames generated using different donor subject.
the situation in the near future. Because the synthesized re-
gion is different from face swapping DeepFake videos (the
whole face in the former and lip area in the latter), detection
methods designed based on artifacts specific to face swap-
ping are unlikely to be effective for these videos. Correspond-
ingly, we should develop detection methods that are effective
to these types of DeepFake videos.
Audio DeepFakes. AI-based impersonation are not limited to
imagery, recent AI-synthesized content-generation are lead-
ing to the creation of highly realistic audios [28, 29]. Us-
ing synthesized audios of the impersonating target can sig-
nificantly make the DeepFake videos more convincing and
compounds its negative impact. As audio signals are 1D sig-
nals and have very different nature from images and videos,
different methods need to be developed to specifically tar-
geting such forgeries. This problem has drawn attention in
the speech processing community recently with part of the
most recent Global ASVspoofing Challenge4 dedicated to AI-
driven voice conversion detection, and a few dedicated meth-
ods for audio DeepFake detection, e.g., [30], have also shown
up recently. In the coming years, we expect more develop-
ments in these areas, in particular, those can leverage features
in both visual and audio features of the fake videos.
Intent Inference. Even though the potential negative impacts
of DeepFake videos are tremendous, in reality, the majority of
DeepFake videos are not created not with a malicious intent.
Many DeepFake videos currently circulated online are of a
pranksome, humorous, or satirical nature. As such, it is im-
portant to expose the underlying intent of a DeepFake in the
context of legal or journalistic investigation. Inferring inten-
tion may require more semantic and contextual understanding
of the content, few forensic methods are designed to answer
this question, but this is certainly a direction that future foren-
4https://www.asvspoof.org/.
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Fig. 4. Overview of the proposed method of disrupting AI face syn-
thesis. Our aim is to use the adversarial perturbations (amplified
by 30 for better visualization) to distract DNN-based face detectors,
such that the quality of the obtained face set as training data to the
AI face synthesis is reduced.
sic methods will focus on.
Anti-forensics. With the increasing effectiveness of Deep-
Fake detection methods, we also anticipate developments of
corresponding anti-forensic measures, which take advantage
of the vulnerabilities of current DeepFake detection meth-
ods to conceal revealing traces of DeepFake videos. The
data-driven deep neural network based DeepFake detection
methods are particularly susceptible to anti-forensic attacks
due to the known vulnerability of general deep neural net-
work classification models. Anti-forensic measures can also
be developed in the other aspect, to disguise a real video as
a DeepFake video by adding simulated signal level features
used by current detection algorithms, a situation we term as
fake DeepFake. Further DeepFake detection methods must
improve to handle such intentional and adversarial attacks.
Human Performance. Although the potential negative im-
pacts of online DeepFake videos are widely recognized, cur-
rently there is a lack of formal and quantitative study of the
perceptual and psychological factors underlying their decep-
tiveness. Interesting questions such as if there exist an un-
canny valley5 for DF videos, what is the just noticeable differ-
ence between high-quality DeepFake videos and real videos
to human eyes, or what type/aspects of DeepFake videos are
5The uncanny valley in ths context refers to the phenomenon whereby a
DeepFake generated face bearing a near-identical resemblance to a human
being arouses a sense of unease or revulsion in the viewers.
more effective in deceiving the viewers, have yet to be an-
swered. To pursue these questions, it calls for close collab-
oration among researchers in digital media forensics and in
perceptual and social psychology. There is no doubt that such
studies are invaluable to research in detection techniques as
well as a better understanding of the social impact that Deep-
Fakes can cause.
Protection measures. However, given the speed and reach
of the propagation of online media, even the currently best
forensic techniques will largely operate in a postmortem fash-
ion, applicable only after AI synthesized fake face images or
videos emerge. We aim to develop proactive approaches to
protect individuals from becoming the victims of such attacks,
which complement to the forensic tools.
One such method we have recently studied [31] is to add
specially designed patterns known as the adversarial pertur-
bations that are imperceptible to human eyes but can result in
detection failures. The rationale is as follows. High-quality
AI face synthesis models need large number of, typically in
the range of thousands, sometimes even millions, training
face images collected using automatic face detection meth-
ods, i.e., the face sets. Adversarial perturbations “pollute” a
face set to have few actual faces and many non-faces with low
or no utility as training data for AI face synthesis models, Fig.
4. The proposed adversarial perturbation generation method
can be implemented as a service of photo/video sharing plat-
forms before a user’s personal images/videos are uploaded or
as a standalone tool that the user can use, to process the im-
ages and videos before they are uploaded online.
4. CONCLUSION
We predict that several future technological developments
will further improve the visual quality and generation effi-
ciency of the fake videos. Firstly, one critical disadvantage of
the current DeepFake generation methods are that they can-
not produce good details such as skin and facial hairs. This is
due to the loss of information in the encoding step of gener-
ation. However, this can be improved by incorporating GAN
models[32] which have demonstrated performance in recov-
ering facial details in recent works [33, 34]. Secondly, the
synthesized videos can be more realistic if they are accom-
panied with realistic voices, which combines video and audio
synthesis together in one tool.
In the face of this, the overall running efficiency, detection
accuracy, and more importantly, false positive rate, have to be
improved for wide practical adoption. The detection meth-
ods also need to be more robust to real-life post-processing
steps, social media laundering, and counter-forensic tech-
nologies. There is a perpetual competition of technology,
know-hows, and skills between the forgery makers and dig-
ital media forensic researchers. The future will reckon the
predictions we make in this work.
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